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COMPETENCES OF THE “UNION” AND SEX 
EQUALITY: A COMPARATIVE LOOK AT THE 
EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES 
Barbara Havelková* †
The delivery of substantive sex equality guarantees in the European Un-
ion and the United States is substantially affected by the division of powers 
(“competences” in European terminology) between the constituent units and 
the center. This Commentary compares the technical similarities and differ-
ences between the structures of competence of the federal systems of the 
United States and the European Union. This Commentary also briefly 
sketches their impact on substantive sex equality law.  
I. Introduction to Sex Equality Law in the  
United States and European Union 
United States 
United States equality law developed principally as a reaction to slavery, 
segregation, and discrimination against African-Americans and other racial 
groups. At its base stood the 1868 Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection 
Clause binding the states, and the 1791 Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment binding the Union. Both of these constitutional provisions, al-
though not explicitly referring to protected grounds, have been interpreted 
to guarantee equality on the basis of sex.  
Federal statutes further guarantee specific sex equality rights. Notably, 
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits employment discrimination, 
and Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments prohibits sex discrimina-
tion in education. Further statutory guarantees include equal pay, treatment 
in housing, education, and credit opportunities.  
European Union 
While the center in the United States is responsible for both the econ-
omy (in terms of creating a single market between the states) and the 
protection of human rights, the European divided-power system has two 
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centers—the European Communities/European Union (“EC/EU”) and the 
Council of Europe. The European Communities’ (“EC”) primary purpose is 
economic integration, whereas the Council of Europe protects human rights. 
In the latter system, the European Convention on Human Rights contains a 
sex equality guarantee that is guarded by the European Court of Human 
Rights. The EC, on the other hand, began its history of sex equality law with 
an economically motivated equal pay provision (Article 119; today 141 of 
the EC Treaty (“TEC”)). Race equality entered into the acquis communau-
taire, the total body of EC law, only four decades later.  
Today, sex equality is seen as a fundamental right with constitutional 
status as a result of the case-law of the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”). 
At the statutory level (secondary law), the EC has passed nine original di-
rectives implementing the principle of equality between men and women in 
the areas of employment, occupation, social security, and access to goods 
and services. These directives contain equality guarantees (e.g., equal treat-
ment in access to employment or equal pay) as well as special rights (e.g., 
pregnancy protection and maternity leave). The EC guarantees are compara-
tively very generous. Unlike in the United States, the European law protects 
transsexuals and homosexuals from discrimination, applies equal worth 
analysis in equal pay cases, shifts the burden of proof to the defendant for 
production and persuasion, and provides abundant special labor and social 
rights connected to pregnancy and parenthood. 
II. How Legislative Competences Have Been Construed 
United States 
The two most important legal bases for federal legislation on equality 
have been the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause. Congress 
passed Title VII under its Commerce Clause authority, and Title IX under 
the Spending Clause. An Equal Rights Amendment (“ERA”) to the Consti-
tution, adopted by both houses of Congress in the early 1970s, would have 
given Congress the “power to enforce” equal rights on account of sex. How-
ever, by 1982, the effort to ratify the ERA had failed. 
Both the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause were used 
to adopt the Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA”). However, in United 
States v. Morrison, the Supreme Court declared the provisions of VAWA 
providing for civil remedies in federal courts unconstitutional. In refusing 
the Fourteenth Amendment as a legal basis for the provisions, the Court 
argued that the amendment historically “erect[ed] no shield against merely 
private conduct,” but prohibited only the actions of states. Under the Com-
merce Clause, the Court denied that domestic violence had an economic 
effect, notwithstanding the massive congressional record evidencing the 
impact of gender-based violence on women’s economic opportunities. See-
ing sex-based violence as a traditional, criminal law prerogative of the 
states, the Court concluded it should continue to be governed at the local 
level.  
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From an outside perspective, then, it is surprising to find the heterosexist 
definition of “spouse” and “marriage” regulated at the federal level, given 
that family law is a prerogative of the states and at the core of the “private.” 
The legal basis for the 1996 Defense of Marriage Act was the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause—the power to regulate recognition of other States’ acts. 
While it is doubtful that this power extends to the definition of marriage for 
purposes of federal law, the Supreme Court has so far chosen not to review 
its constitutionality.  
European Union 
The European Communities’ central legislator has used several legal 
bases for equality legislation in the past four decades. The counterpart of the 
Interstate Commerce Clause in the EC Treaty (Article 100; today 94) was 
used in conjunction with either the substantive equal pay Article 119 (today 
141) or the “residual power” Article 235 (today 308). Other bases included 
Article 118a of TEC concerning the health and safety of workers, and the 
Agreement on Social Policy. 
The list of competences changed dramatically following the insertion of 
Article 13 by the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997. This empowered the center to 
take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or eth-
nic origin, religion or belief, disability, age, or sexual orientation. However, 
the center could only act “within the limits of the powers conferred by . . . 
[the Treaty] upon the Community.” Article 13 is a simple competence provi-
sion—it does not actually contain a substantive constitutional guarantee. 
Unlike the United States, where federal statutes further implement the rights 
guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, the European central legislator 
mostly creates these rights in secondary legislation. 
The use of EC competences has never been challenged before the ECJ. 
The reason for this lies, primarily, in the fact that the Community legislator 
has limited itself to clear economic issues. The use of existing EC compe-
tences for the adoption of binding legislation addressing domestic violence 
is unlikely at this time. 
III. Legal Instruments 
United States 
In the United States, federal equality guarantees are contained in the 
Constitution and statutes. They can also be found in executive orders (e.g., 
affirmative action) and regulations of federal agencies, such as the U.S. 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). The EEOC regula-
tions are generally not considered binding as judicial deference toward them 
varies. These instruments provide three levels of equality protection in terms 
of addressees: the federal government (by virtue of the Fifth Amendment), 
the states (through the Fourteenth Amendment) and individuals directly 
(through the Civil Rights Act).  
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European Union 
The European Union also recognizes a constitutional principle of non-
discrimination on the basis of sex. Its primary addressee is the center, which 
is bound by this principle in all of its areas of competence. The Member 
States, however, are only bound “within the scope of Community law,” due 
to the non-existence of an all-encompassing bill of rights binding the con-
stituent units, The circumscription of the EC’s competence is thus reflected 
in the sex equality guarantee’s scope in the Member States in a way that 
does not exist in the United States. Naturally, the Member States may have 
their own sex equality guarantees, but these vary.  
The principle of equal pay (Article 141), even though contained in the 
Treaty, is not generally considered a constitutional principle. It does, how-
ever, bind the Member States (to whom it was addressed in the first place), 
as it has what is called a “vertical direct effect.” It is also directly effective 
in horizontal relationships, as it binds private actors within the Member 
States.  
In terms of secondary legislation in the area of sex equality, the EC 
regulates by directives. Directives are an instrument of “commandeering,” 
whereby the center issues binding commands that force constituent units to 
legislate with respect to private parties. Such an instrument does not have an 
equivalent in the United States system. Directives cannot bind individuals 
the same way federal statutes do. Individuals are only bound by provisions 
of national law that transpose them. Thus, unity of the protection in EC 
equality law is lower than with federal statutes in the United States. The 
transposing national provisions are implanted into a web of existing norms, 
so that the actual protection can differ. This is particularly so with proce-
dural law, and it impacts, for example, the effectiveness of the Burden of 
Proof Directive. Some questions are also explicitly left to the discretion of 
the Member States—references to “national legislation or practice” abound. 
The Council, or the European Parliament, may also issue non-binding rec-
ommendations, and have done so on such issues as political representation, 
dignity at the workplace, or positive action. 
Thus, the EC system also contains three levels of sex equality protec-
tion: the center binds itself (case-law based fundamental right), the states 
(the fundamental right in implementing EC law; Article 141 and the direc-
tives), and individuals (both directly by virtue of Article 141’s horizontal 
direct effect, and by national law implementing the directives). 
IV. Courts 
United States 
The aforementioned is mirrored in the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 
Given the existence of a constitutional guarantee, constitutional questions of 
sex equality before the federal courts arise in a wide range of substantive 
areas including reproduction, family, some issues involving Indian Reserva-
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tions, and, on occasion, rape. The federal courts also adjudicate Title VII 
and Title IX. 
European Union 
Before the ECJ, only one case, Rinke v. Arztekammer Hamburg, has ad-
dressed the constitutionality of non-equality central legislation on the basis of 
its potential conflict with the EC principle of sex equality. Without an all-
encompassing guarantee, some questions never arise before the ECJ (or when 
they do, they are not considered EC/EU matters). Such questions include re-
productive rights, gender-based violence, and political representation. 
Questions like these, admittedly, arise before the European Court of Human 
Rights, which has dealt with broader issues of sex equality (i.e., domestic 
violence, rape, prostitution, veiling, etc.) under various human rights ru-
brics.  
Furthermore, most questions concerning sex equality law arrive at the 
ECJ as preliminary questions from the national courts. Under this proce-
dure, the ECJ examines the validity and interpretation of EC law only. This 
provides the national courts rather abstract, generalized interpretations of 
the EC provisions. In many cases, the central questions regarding sex equal-
ity remain unanswered by the ECJ because they would not be considered a 
matter of EC law, and are thus left to national courts. This is true not only of 
technical issues (such as temporal rules or the conduct of fact-finding) but 
also of many questions central to implementing sex equality, such as accept-
able justifications for prima facie indirectly discriminatory measures 
(disparate impact). 
V. Discussion and Conclusions 
Explicit competence-creation on sex equality questions has happened 
much faster in the European Union than in the United States. It should, how-
ever, be pointed out that the EC/EU competence provisions require 
unanimity for the adoption of directives, which means Member States de 
facto keep equality law in their control (through their representatives in the 
Council). Furthermore, the secondary legislation resulting from the use of 
Article 94 TEC has been meek compared to, for example, the VAWA, as it 
only touches on obvious, market-relevant areas. The competence provision 
of Article 13 TEC is limited to existing EC powers. A stretch in interpreta-
tion of this competence into intra-state sex equality issues, such as gender-
based violence, will likely not occur any time soon.  
Seeing the failed ERA and the Morrison decision in the United States, 
one might conclude that more has remained with the states than the U.S. 
federal government, and that the European Union might soon overtake the 
United States. Yet because of the existence of an all-encompassing principle 
of equality enshrined in the U.S. Constitution, the potential for federal ac-
tion will be greater in the United States until the EC/EU adopts a similar 
provision (which again seems unlikely). Also, the use of directives and the 
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limited judicial review powers of the ECJ might restrain some of the central 
competence in the EC/EU. This leaves much to be decided at the Member 
State level and leads to lower levels of unity across the European Union.  
A future development to watch is the Lisbon Treaty, which strengthens 
the European Union’s competence to fight cross-border crime by enabling it 
to adopt directives to battle “trafficking in human beings and sexual exploi-
tation of women and children.” It is in this area of interstate criminal 
cooperation (but not intrastate, non-economic issues) that the European Un-
ion might outdo the United States in upcoming years.  
